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The discount on closed-end funds is widely accepted as proof of investor irrationality. We
show,however, that a parsimonious rational model can generate a discount that exhibits many of the
characteristics observed in practice. The only required features of the model are that managers have
(imperfectly observable) ability to generate excess returns; they sign long-term contracts
guaranteeing them a fee each year equal to a fixed fraction of assets under management; and they
can leave to earn more money elsewhere if they turn out to be good. With these assumptions, time-
varying discounts are not an anomaly in a rational world with competitive investors -- they are
required.
Jonathan Berk










There is perhaps no empirical regularity cited more often as evidence of investor irrationality
than the discount at which closed-end funds trade relative to their net asset value (NAV).
In their inﬂuential survey of the literature, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) identify the four
main empirical regularities exhibited by the discount:
1. Closed-end funds are issued at (or above) their NAV, more often than not start trading
at a premium to NAV, and then decline.1
2. On average, closed end funds trade at a discount relative to their NAV.2
3. The discount is subject to wide variation over time and across funds.3
4. At termination, price converges to NAV.4
They conclude that no rational model could simultaneously explain all of these regularities,
that the behavior of closed-end funds is an example of the “limits of arbitrage”, and that
“The major lesson we take from this analysis is that the demand for securities can inﬂuence
price, even if that demand is based on irrational beliefs.” Other researchers have reached
similar conclusions. For example, Pontiﬀ (1996) says that “Pricing theories that are based
on fundamentals have had very little, if any, ability to explain discounts.”
One problem with this conclusion is that the discount in the UK behaves very like that
in the US, while the vast majority of closed-end funds in the UK are held by institutions.5
This suggests that there might be a rational explanation for at least some of the observed
behavior of the closed-end fund discount. In this paper we develop a parsimonious rational
model of closed-end fund management in which the discount exhibits all four of the major
empirical regularities identiﬁed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990).
The aim of this paper is not to argue that irrational beliefs or other behavioral factors
are not important. Our contribution to the literature is rather to clarify just what features
of the discount are also consistent with a rational model. This will help future researchers
to identify the regularities that are more likely to be evidence of investor irrationality.
Our model is based on only three main assumptions. First we assume that management
talent exists, though it is unobservable. Thus, on average, managers can, by correctly picking
stocks, generate returns in excess of their fees. Second, we assume that managers sign long-
term contracts with the fund, paying them a ﬁxed percentage of assets under management
1See Weiss (1989), Peavy (1990), and Weiss Hanley, Lee, and Seguin (1996).
2See Pratt (1966) and Zweig (1973).
3See Sharpe and Sosin (1975), Thompson (1978), Richards, Fraser, and Groth (1980), Herzfeld (1980),
Anderson (1986), and Brauer (1988).
4See Brauer (1984) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985).
5For example, Brown (1998) reports that insitututions held 78% of UK closed-end funds in 1986.
1each year. Finally, we assume that these contracts are binding on the fund, but not on
the manager — the fund cannot prevent the manager from leaving. These three conditions
interact with each other to produce exactly the observed empirical regularities. Rather than
being anomalies, premia and discounts are required if rational investors correctly use the
information in past returns to infer management ability.
The behavior of the discount is driven by the tradeoﬀ between managerial ability and fees.
Managerial ability adds value to the fund so, in the absence of fees, competitive investors
would be willing to pay a premium over net asset value to invest in the fund. Fees subtract
value from the fund so, in the absence of managerial ability, investors would only be willing
to invest if they could buy shares in the fund at a discount. In the presence of both fees
and managerial ability, the fund may trade at either a premium or a discount depending on
whether fees or ability dominate. This will change over time as investors see the realized
returns on the fund, thereby learning more about the manager’s ability.
If performance is bad, investors infer that they have a bad manager, who charges more
in fees than the value he creates, and the fund will trade at a discount. Moreover, such a
manager is entrenched because of the long term employment contract signed at inception,
so the discount is likely to persist. If performance is good, investors infer that they have a
good manager, who adds more in value than the fees he charges, and the fund will trade at a
premium. However, the manager will eventually either quit the fund for another job that will
allow him to capture the beneﬁt he provides, or else he will negotiate a pay increase. Thus
premia should be short-lived; most funds will sell at a discount until close to their termination
date, when the capitalized value destroyed by the manager becomes small. Investors fully
anticipate this behavior, and so expect a closed-end fund to move into discount after its issue
date. Investors are still willing to invest at NAV on the IPO because the fee the manager
charges is less than the value he is expected to add. In expectation, the additional value
added by the manager is exactly cancelled by the expected growth in the discount, and
investors get a fair return.
This paper is closely related to the Berk and Green (2002) model of open-end mutual
fund management. Both papers use the same economic idea — competition between in-
vestors drives the expected returns on an investment fund to the competitive level — but
its application to closed-end funds is very diﬀerent. In Berk and Green (2002), the price of
the (open-end) fund is forced to equal NAV at the end of each day. Competition between
investors cannot, therefore, change the price of the fund, but instead causes cash in- and
out-ﬂows to and from the fund, which drive the returns on the fund to the competitive level.
This explains the observed relation between open-end mutual fund ﬂows and performance.
With closed-end funds there are no cash in- or out-ﬂows from the fund, but the price is not
2ﬁxed. Thus, while the assets under management remain ﬁxed, competition between investors
causes the fund’s price to change until the return is again driven to the competitive level.
Taken together, the papers show that two diﬀerent, widely recognized, empirical puzzles —
the ﬂow of funds/performance relation in open funds and the discounts of closed-end funds
— can both be explained by the same economic fundamentals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews other explanations for the closed-end
fund discount. Section 3 develops the formal model, and Section 4 investigates the model’s
empirical implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Prior Explanations for the Closed-End Fund Dis-
count6
A number of explanations for the closed-end fund discount have been proposed that are based
on market frictions such as illiquidity and taxes. If a fund owns a lot of restricted stock, or
other illiquid assets, which do not trade freely, its NAV may not accurately reﬂect its true
value, in which case the fact that it does not trade at its NAV is not particularly surprising.
Malkiel (1977) and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) ﬁnd that holdings of restricted stock do
have some explanatory power for discounts, but these holdings are small or zero for most
funds, so cannot fully explain the “anomaly”. Seltzer (1989) suggests that funds holding
illiquid assets are likely to be overvalued, but this is inconsistent with the fact that funds’
price rises when they are open-ended.
Full taxes on a fund’s realized capital gains are paid by current shareholders even if most
of the gains occurred before they bought their shares. This would imply that funds with
large accumulated gains should trade at a discount to NAV. However, Malkiel (1977) ﬁnds
that even a fund with (a very high) 25% of its assets in unrealized appreciation would see
an average discount of only 5%, and moreover the fact that prices rise to NAV on fund
liquidation suggests that this factor cannot be the main factor driving discounts.
Brickley, Manaster, and Schallheim (1991) and Kim (1994) suggest an alternative tax-
timing explanation based on the idea that holding shares indirectly via a closed-end fund
precludes an investor from doing the direct trading in the underlying shares necessary to
follow the optimal tax timing strategy.7 The empirical evidence is mixed. For example,
Kim (1994) documents a large increase in the number of closed-end funds after 1986, when
changes in the tax-law reduced the tax disadvantage of holding closed-end funds, but DeLong,
6The discussion in this section is based on very clear surveys of the literature by Dimson and Minio-
Kozerski (1999), Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990), and Anderson and Born (2002).
7See, for example, Constantinides (1983, 1984).
3Bradford, and Shleifer (1992) document that the discount increased between 1985 and 1990.
In addition, the tax-timing option cannot explain funds trading at a premium, and should
apply to both open and closed-end funds.
Besides frictions, the other main explanations that have been suggested for the discount
are fees and managerial ability. The idea that a closed-end fund will trade for a discount
if the manager charges fees (but does not add value) was originally proposed by Malkiel
(1977). If managers charge fees, and provide nothing of value in return, then the value of
the fund to investors should be lower than the fund’s NAV. Gemmill and Thomas (2002),
Ross (2002a), and Cherkes (2003) show that if the fund pays out a fraction γ to investors




In particular, if the payout rate to investors is zero, the discount is 100% regardless of how
small the fractional fee paid to managers each year.8 Empirically, Malkiel (1977) did not
ﬁnd that fees signiﬁcantly explained variation in the level of the discount, although Kumar
and Noronha (1992) ﬁnd that diﬀerences in fees do explain a small proportion of the cross-
sectional variation in discounts. The main drawback of this explanation is that it cannot,
alone, explain why closed-end funds trade at a discount, while open-end funds with similar
fees trade at NAV. Nor can it explain why closed-end funds are issued at or above their NAV.
We will argue in this paper that it is not variation in fees, but rather variation in managerial
ability that explains cross-sectional variation in discounts.
If some managers add value, a fund will trade at a discount if investors believe its manager
is relatively poor at investing their money (so they do not make back their fees), and at a
premium if investors believe the manager is relatively good at investing. Lee, Shleifer,
and Thaler (1990) point out that for this to explain the usual overall discount, together
with the premium at the IPO, investors must expect superior returns at the IPO, but then
(predictably) later expect poor performance. Our model predicts exactly this behavior for
the return on the fund’s underlying assets. However, when this is combined with the time-
series behavior of the discount, investors in the fund’s shares always receive the fair rate of
return.
Empirical evidence on investors’ returns is mixed. Consistent with our model, Malkiel
(1977) ﬁnds no relation between past performance and discounts. However, Simon (1969)
ﬁnds that relatively high (low) discounts are associated with relatively worse (better) perfor-
8A simple way to see this intuitively is to think of the fund manager as being awarded a fraction δ of the
shares remaining in the fund each year. After t years, investors are left with (1 − δ)t times the number of
shares they started with, which goes to zero as t →∞ .
4mance, and Roenfeldt and Tuttle (1973) ﬁnds a weak relation between the contemporaneous
discount and performance.
The explanation most closelyrelated to ours, inthat it attempts simultaneouslyto explain
both the issue price and the subsequent discount, is Ross (2002b). Like us, Ross derives a
rational model of closed-end funds that explains the post-IPO discounts as a function of the
diﬀerence between the value added by the manager and the fees charged. Initially, on the
IPO, investors are asymmetrically informed about the quality of the manager, and because
of the idiosyncrasies of the IPO process, this information is not revealed until after the
issue. Hence the fund can be issued at NAV. Although we derive many of same implications,
Ross’ model diﬀers from ours in a number of important respects. We do not appeal to an
information asymmetry — all of our participants are symmetrically informed. Hence, our
explanation for why the fund is issued at NAV does not rely on the idiosyncrasies of the IPO
process itself. In addition, Ross (2002b) does not examine the implication of a long term
labor contract on the fund’s performance. Consequently, that paper cannot explain the
predictable increase in the discount after the IPO, an important contribution of this paper.
Ross does not model the intertemporal rational expectations equilibrium and so does not
make an inference about the dynamic behavior of the post oﬀering price relative to the pre
oﬀering price. However, to be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium, investors
cannot be fooled, so their expectation of the post oﬀering price must be realized on average.
In Ross’ model this implies that to induce them to participate, on average, the post oﬀering
price must equal the pre oﬀering price.
Cherkes (2003) independently develops a related model in which the discount is deter-
mined by investors’ tradeoﬀ between fees paid and the additional liquidity beneﬁts that
accrue through holding the closed-end fund rather than owning the underlying assets di-
rectly. Incorporating a liquidity factor allows the model to explain why discounts on related
funds tend to move together, something we do not attempt to explain. However, his model
does not explain the predictable widening of the discount following the fund’s IPO.
3 The Model
Although Section 1 communicated the basic intuition of our model, it says nothing about
the size of the eﬀects. To see whether the intuition we describe can produce discounts of
the same order of magnitude as observed, this section develops a formal model of closed-end
fund management and investment, based on the open-end fund model in Berk and Green
(2002). Our intention is to build a parsimonious model of closed-end funds that captures
the salient features of the data, rather than to model every idiosyncrasy of the industry. For
5instance, the typical labor contract in the industry is very much like a CEO’s labor contract
— the manager serves at the will of board of directors. How this translates into the tenure
of a manager is a complicated question and beyond the scope of this paper. Past research
has found that proxy contests are rare, and managers are very rarely ﬁred,9 so we will simply
assume that a manager cannot be ﬁred and can, at his or her own discretion, manage the
fund until time T when the assets of the fund are distributed to shareholders.10 We will refer
to this date as the open date of the fund. Closed-end funds do not in practice have a ﬁxed
open date. We could alternatively model the opening of the fund via, for example, some
Poisson process with a ﬁxed arrival rate. This would not substantially alter the behavior of
the discount near the IPO. The advantage of choosing a ﬁxed open date is that it allows us
to use the same model to study the behavior of the discount in both of the periods prior
research has identiﬁed as important – just after the IPO, and just before the fund is opened.
Assume the (continuously-compounded) return generated by the manager is given by
rt =ˆ rt + α −
1
2ω
+  t, (1)
where ˆ rt is the return on the (observable) portfolio held at the start of the period,




rt does not necessarily equal ˆ rt as the manager adds value by selecting stocks, so the portfolio
composition changes over time. ξt is an i.i.d. normal random variable with mean zero and
precision ζ, representing the volatility of the assets in the fund at the beginning of the
period, and r is the expected return on these assets.  t is an i.i.d. normal random variable,
independent of ξt and any risk factor in the economy (it is purely idiosyncratic uncertainty),
with mean zero and precision ω =1 /σ2, representing the eﬀect of unobservable changes in
portfolio composition during the period. If the manager’s skill level, α, is positive (negative)
the manager earns an average return greater (less) than the expected return on the portfolio
at the beginning of the period. The manager charges a proportional fee, c,p e rp e r i o d ,s o
the fund’s net asset value at time t,N A V t, evolves as follows:
NAVt =N A V t−1 e
rt−c. (3)
9See Brauer (1984, 1988) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985). These papers demonstrate very large gains
are associated with managerial turnover, suggesting that large costs must be incurred in order to achieve
the turnover, supporting the idea that most managers are entrenched
10In reality there are three ways to end a closed-end fund: (1) it can change to an open-end fund structure,
(2) it can liquidate, or (3) it can merge with open-end fund. See Brauer (1984) for more details.
6Consider a manager who begins managing the fund in period τ. Neither investors nor
the manager know the value of α, the manager’s skill level. They both have the same prior
on α at time τ —n o r m a lw i t hm e a nφτ and precision γ =1 /η2. After observing the returns
the manager generates, investors and managers alike update their priors. Let φt denote the
mean of the posterior distribution at time t, that is, the expectation of α conditional on
seeing all returns up to and including rt, i.e.
φt = Et[α]. (4)
The evolution of the priors is governed by:
Proposition 1 At time t, the posterior distribution of α is a normal distribution with mean
φt and variance
1
γ+(t−τ)ω,w h e r eφt is the solution to
φt+1 = φt +
ω
γ + ω(t − τ +1 )




Proof: Follows directly from DeGroot (1970) (Theorem 1, p. 167).
The manager generates an excess return equal to rt+1 − ˆ rt+1. By the result above, its mean
and variance are given by




vart[rt+1 − ˆ rt+1]=
γ +( t − τ +1 ) ω












Although the manager cannot be ﬁred, we do allow him or her to leave the fund. In
reality, managers will quit (or successfully negotiate a pay raise) when they have a more
lucrative outside oﬀer. Rather than explicitly model the arrival of these oﬀers, we will
simply assume that if the manager’s ability φt rises above some level ¯ φ,h ei so ﬀ e r e dm o r e
lucrative employment elsewhere and quits. Clearly ¯ φ ≥ φτ (otherwise he would never choose
to be a closed-end fund manager).
7Assume the manager gets a ﬁxed amount of capital to invest at time 0, and that no
additional capital enters or leaves the fund until the open date, T, when the proceeds are
distributed to the shareholders at net asset value. For convenience, assume that all dividends
are reinvested in the fund. Competition between investors implies that, in equilibrium, they
cannot earn an expected return greater than r by investing in the fund. Since they are
rational, they will not accept an expected return lower than r, so their expected return from
investing in the fund must always exactly equal r. Since the expected return the manager
generates, after fees, will in general not equal r, the only way this can occur is if the price
of the fund adjusts so that it is not equal to the NAV.
Write the price of the closed-end fund at time t as Pτ
t (NAVt,φ t), where the current








the price of the fund expressed as a fraction of NAV. The discount is then 1 − Dτ
t (φt). At
the open date, T, the assets are distributed to investors so
D
τ
T(φT)=1 ∀ φT. (11)
If the fund were issued at a premium (because the fee charged is less than the value added by
the manager), the manager would have an incentive to quit the fund once it was established
and start a new fund, since part of his compensation is paid up front in the form of the
premium. Consequently, investors would not bid the price up to the full capitalized value.
This is costly to the manager, so one would expect him to set the fee at a level where the fund
would not trade at a premium. Similarly, if the fund were issued at a discount (because the
fee charged is more than the value added by the manager), the manager would in eﬀect be
choosing to defer compensation. Assuming managers are cash constrained (otherwise there
would be no reason for them to market their skill to outside investors), this would not be
a preferred outcome from their point of view, so one would expect the fund to be issued at




When φt ≥ ¯ φ the old manager quits, a new manager is hired at the same fee, and the fund
will again trade at its NAV. This condition pins down the ability level of the new manager






t (¯ φ)=1τ<t≤ T. (14)
The following proposition derives the price of the fund as a function of φ, the perceived
quality of the manager, and the manager’s tenure:
Proposition 2 Let Dτ
t (φt) denote the price as a fraction of NAV at time t for a fund with
open date T, and a manager of perceived ability φt who started with the fund at date τ.T h e n
Dτ
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Φt ) dφ o.w.
(15)
subject to the boundary condition that Dτ
T(φ)=1 ,w h e r e∆t and Φt are as deﬁned in Equa-
tions (7) and (9), and where N[·] and n(·) are the standard Normal cumulative distribution
and density functions respectively.
Proof: See Appendix B.1.





4 Empirical Implications of the Model
This section calibrates the model to the data using results from prior research, and shows
that it generates the four empirical regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990),
with magnitudes comparable to those observed by previous researchers. Our objective in
this section is not to argue that the model can explain every detail of the closed-end fund
puzzle, but rather to show that the four most important features of the closed-end fund
discount can be produced by a parsimonious rational model.
94.1 Calibration
We begin with ω, the precision of the diﬀerence between the return of the fund and the return
of the underlying assets held at the beginning of the period. Using US data (1965–85) Pontiﬀ
(1997) reports a mean monthly variance across funds of the percentage diﬀerence between
these two returns equal to 37.33. Adams (2000) ﬁnds a value of 11.50 for UK funds (1982–
96). As Adams (2000) points out, Pontiﬀ’s data cover a particularly volatile period. More
recently the US has been much closer to the U.K. experience. Furthermore, the distribution
of funds’ volatilities is highly skewed — Pontiﬀ reports a median of only 19.62. In light of
this we set ω = 33. Expressed on a monthly basis for percentage returns, this translates into
a variance of about 25, somewhat less than Pontiﬀ’s mean (but still larger than his median).
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) report that management fees typically range between
0.5% and 2% per year. We use 1%. Since we do not endogenously model management
departure, we must pick an open end date. We choose 10 years.
The remaining three parameters, the prior mean, φ0, and precision, γ, and the level at
which the manager quits, ¯ φ, are not directly observable. Instead we infer their values by
experimenting with parameters that would give realistic values for the average discount and
maximum premium. Table 1 summarizes the ﬁnal choice of parameters. Note that these
Variable Symbol Value
Percentage fee c 1%
Years to Open Date T 10
Mean of prior φ0 6.2%
Prior precision γ 42
Return precision ω 33
Exit mean ¯ φ 6.5%
Table 1: Parameter Values
values of φ0 and γ imply, at least initially, that 63% of managers have enough skill to make
back what they charge in fees, and since the average manager initially has an α of 6.2%
but only charges a 1% fee, his initial excess returns are substantially higher than the fees he
charges.
4.2 Discount vs. Ability
Equation (15) can be used recursively to calculate the discount as a function of ability for a
fund of any age. Figure 1 plots Dτ
t against ability, φt, for new managers and for managers
with tenures 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 years. The fund starts with an open date 10 years in the future.
10The solid lines are for managers who leave when φ is equal to ¯ φ =0 .065, and the dotted
lines show the value of Dτ
t given in Equation (16) for an otherwise identical fund, except
that ¯ φ = ∞ (i.e. the manager cannot leave the fund).
Figure 1: Discount as a Function of Ability: The plots show the price of the fund,
expressed as % NAV, for funds with an open date of 10 years as a function of perceived management
ability(φ), color coded by management tenure. Red, yellow, green, blue, cyan and violet correspond
to a new manager and managers with tenures of 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 years respectively. (The lines are
also marked for readers without access to color.) The parameter values are given in Table 1. The
solid lines are for a manager with ¯ φ =0 .065, and the dotted lines show the discount for an otherwise
identical fund with ¯ φ = ∞.
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As the plots show, for low value of φ, the relation between ability and the discount is
intuitive — a positive change in ability translates into higher expected returns which lead
to smaller discounts (D increases). This relation is documented empirically by Chay and
Trzcinka (1999). However, at high enough levels of φ, the discount and ability are inversely
related, so an increase in ability translates into an increase in the discount (or, equivalently,
a decrease in the premium or a lower value of D). The reason for this behavior is that
greater ability implies a higher likelihood that the manager will quit, either now or in the
near future (when φ hits ¯ φ), to be replaced with a manager of lower ability. Note that the
nonmonotonicity does not only occur at the point φ = ¯ φ. For example, for a tenure of 6
years, the graph slopes downwards before the jump. This is because, in this region, as ability
increases, even though it is not high enough to cause the manager to leave immediately, it
makes it more likely that he will leave in the near future.
The fact that there is a region where D(·) is decreasing is interesting because it poten-
tially could contribute to an empirical phenomenon past researchers have found puzzling.
11Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Ross (2002b) ﬁnd that the empirical relation between
past performance and the discount is negative — when funds outperform the market, the
discount subsequently increases. As Figure 1 makes clear, good current performance need
not translate into future outperformance if the result is that the manager gets an outside
oﬀer of employment. Although not part of our model, extremely bad performance might
not translate into future underperformance if the resulting update on managerial ability is
enough to motivate dissatisﬁed shareholders to mount a proxy ﬁght to terminate the fund.
Potentially, these two eﬀects might explain the empirical puzzle, although evaluating their
importance is clearly beyond the scope of the current paper.
Figure 2 shows the initial ability of a newly hired manager as a function of the number of
years until the fund’s open date. The ﬁrst manager hired (when the open date is 10 years in
the future) has an initial ability of 6.2%. Note that this value is well in excess of the fee (1%).
The reason for this is that the long term labor contract oﬀers insurance. The cost of this
insurance can be inferred from the dotted line, which shows the ability level of a manager
who can never quit the fund.11 The large diﬀerence between the two values (6.9% for the
ﬁrst manager) reﬂects the value of the insurance. Investors demand much higher qualiﬁed
managers knowing that the bad ones will become entrenched. This diﬀerence shrinks as
the number of years to the open date decreases, as Figure 2 shows. When the manager
cannot quit, the required initial ability of the manager rises because the beneﬁt derived from
the skewness of the log normal distribution is reduced. Concomitantly, the length of the
insurance contract decreases, so the required initial ability of a manager who is free to quit
decreases. Consequently the two curves in Figure 2 converge to each other.
4.3 Evolution of the Average Discount
Three of the four empirical regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) concern
the behavior of the discount of the average fund. In this section we will derive investors’
expectations of this behavior within our model, and show that they expect to see exactly
the regularities observed in practice.
To compute the expected discount at some point in the future, we will compute the
distribution of managerial abilityat that time, and then use the relation between the discount
and managerial ability derived in Section 3. The distribution of future managerial ability is
determined both by investors updating on performance and by managerial turnover. First
11Investors are willing to hire such a low quality manager because of the skewness of the lognormal
distribution. Since the manager cannot quit, the disproportionate gain if the manager turns out to be good,
makes up for the fact that investors expect the average manager to destroy value.
12Figure 2: Initial Ability: The solid (blue) line shows the initial ability of the manager as
a function of the number of years to the open date for a manager who can quit the fund when
φ>¯ φ =0 .065. The dashed (red) line is the initial ability of a manager who can commit to
remaining with the fund until the open date (i.e., ¯ φ = ∞). The other parameter values are given
in Table 1.
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γ +( t − τ)ω
 
(α − φt−1 +  t),
so that
φt = φt−1 + Rt.
Note that Rt is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance Φ2
t−1. Assume the current
manager was hired at time τ with skill level φτ given by the solution to (13).
Let f
φτ,τ
t (φ) denote the p.d.f. of φt for a manager who starts with a fund at time τ<t ,
conditional on not having left the fund prior to t, where the fund has open date T,a n d
the manager has initial prior expected ability ability φτ.L e tF
φτ,τ













It will often be simpler to work with the improper p.d.f. and c.d.f.,
˜ F
φτ,τ









Lemma 1 in Appendix A provides expressions relating the proper and improper forms, and
Lemma 2 derives explicit representations for f
φτ,τ
t (φ)a n d ˜ f
φτ,τ
t (φ). The next proposition
derives the expected discount.























t (φ)dφ is the probability that a manager who starts with a fund at
time τ leaves the fund at time t,a n dw h e r eHt is the probability that a fund that starts at
time zero with open date T will have a manager leave (equivalently, have a manager start)







with the boundary condition H0 =1 .
14Proof: See Appendix B.2.
Figure 3 plots the expected value of the price of the fund, expressed as % NAV, as a
function of the age of the fund. The fund is issued at par with an open-end date 10 years in
the future. Initially, the expected discount increases over time, since the expected quality of
the manager declines — good managers leave, while bad managers become entrenched. The
total capitalized value dissipated by a poor manager depends how long the manager will be
with the fund. As we approach the open date, even a very poor manager does not have time
to hurt investors much, and the price must converge back to NAV.
The plot reproduces three of the four empirical regularities enumerated by Lee, Shleifer,
and Thaler (1990): The fund is issued at par and is expected to fall into discount; it is
expected always to trade at a discount; and this discount is expected to disappear as the
fund approaches its open-date.
Figure 3: Expected Discount as a Function of Fund Age The plot shows the price of the
fund, expressed as % NAV, as a function of fund age. The parameter values are given in Table 1.







The overall level of the discount is similar to that observed in the data. Lee, Shleifer, and
Thaler (1991) analyze US funds between 1965 and 1985, and report that discounts towards
the end of this period tend to be between 10% and 20%. From 1980–98, the average discount
on US stock funds varied from about 0–20%,12 and discounts at the end of the 1990s were
around 10% in the UK and 5% in the US. Anderson and Born (2002) report that in February
12See Dimson and Minio-Kozerski (1999).
152001 the average discount for all equity funds (worldwide) was 10.9%.
Note also that the expected discount grows quite rapidly — the price drops to 91% of
NAV after only 1 year. This fast initial decline is also observed in practice. For example,
Weiss (1989) ﬁnds that after just twelve weeks the average discount for US stock funds in
her sample is just over 2%, and after 24 weeks it is 10%.
4.4 Distribution of the Discount
Only one of the four regularities listed by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) remains to be
explained — the wide dispersion in discounts across funds. In this section we will investigate
the model’s implications for the cross-sectional distribution of discounts.
To compute the distribution of the discount at some point in the future, we will combine
the distribution of managerial ability, f
φτ,τ
t (φ), calculated in Section 4.3 with the relation
between the discount and ability, Dτ
t (φ), calculated in Section 3. This is relatively straight-
forward to do, with one caveat. Dτ
t (φ) is not necessarily monotonic, so it does not have
a unique inverse. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, we can split the range of φ into two
subsets, on each of which Dτ
t (φ) is monotonic. Let ˆ φ be the value of φ at which Dτ
t (φ)
reaches a maximum, let φτ
t(D)d e n o t et h ei n v e r s eo fDτ
t (φt)o v e rt h er e g i o n( −∞, ˆ φ],a n d
let ˆ φτ
t(D)d e n o t et h ei n v e r s eo fDτ
t (φt) over the region (ˆ φ, ¯ φ). The following proposition then
derives the distribution of the discount as a function of management tenure. The proof is
straightforward and left to the reader.
Proposition 4 Let gτ
t (D) be the p.d.f. of D, the price of the fund expressed as a fraction



























t (¯ φ) <D<D τ
t (ˆ φ)
.
Figure 4 plots g using the parameters in Table 1. The four contours that are shown mark
the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 levels on the corresponding c.d.f. That is, taking the lower plot
in Figure 4, the lower black line denotes the 0.2 contour — the probability that a discount
greater than the point on the line will be observed is 20%. The model generates a wide
dispersion in discounts. For example for a manager who has been at the fund for 4 years,
the probability that the discount will be over 55% (the price, expressed at a % of NAV being
less than 45%) is over 20%. Yet there is still a 20% probability of the fund trading at a
premium.
Signiﬁcant dispersion in funds’ discounts occurs very early in practice. For example,
Weiss (1989) ﬁnds that after 24 weeks, while the average discount of the 22 US stock funds
16Figure 4: Distribution of the Discount The plots show, as a function of how long the manager
has been with the fund (tenure), the p.d.f. of price of the fund expressed at a percentage of NAV
(% NAV). The upper plot is a view of the surface from the side. The lower plot is a view of the
same surface from above. The black lines mark the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 contours of the c.d.f. That
is, in the upper plot the right most line is the 0.2 contour, so 20% of the probability mass lies to























































17she studies is 10%, two of the funds still trade at a premium. Figure 4 shows that 20% of
funds trade at a premium at the end of the ﬁrst year. In addition, Thompson (1978) notes
that discounts in excess of “20% are quite frequent, with discounts exceeding 30 and 40%
not uncommon,” consistent with our model.
4.5 NAV return
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) point out that in order for a model with diﬀerential man-
agement ability to generate the observed time series behavior of average discounts, investors
must systematically expect management performance to decline over time. Our model pre-
dicts exactly this behavior.
Investors’ expectations of managerial ability can be measured by the excess expected








be the (gross) realized NAV return. Conditional on information available at time t,a n d
using standard properties of the lognormal distribution, Equations (6) and (7) tell us that
















Therefore deﬁne the continuously compounded excess NAV return as




Investors’ expectations of the future performance of the fund’s initial manager are given by
E0[µt | φ1,...,φ t < ¯ φ]=
  ¯ φ
−∞
 







18Figure 5 plots this expectation as a function of managerial tenure, t. The parameters used
are given in Table 1. The NAV return is initially expected to outperform the benchmark (the
return on the assets held at the beginning of the period), but as the tenure of the manager
increases, it is expected to underperform. With our calibrated parameters, this deterioration
in performance is very rapid – underperformance occurs by the second year of the manager’s
tenure. This is because, at these parameter values, investors learn about managerial ability
very quickly. Hence, most good managers leave early, accounting for the rapid decline in
expected NAV returns.
Figure 5: Expected NAV Excess Return as a Function of Managerial Tenure: The
plot shows the one period expected NAV risk adjusted return, E0[µt | φ1,...,φ t < ¯ φ] for funds
with an open date of 10 years as a function of management tenure (t). The parameter values are
given in Table 1.









Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) summarize the ﬁnance profession’s understanding of the
closed-end fund puzzle by listing four main empirical regularities exhibited by the discount
on these funds. In this paper we show that all four of these empirical regularities can be























s (¯ φ). (24)
Proof: Equation (23) follows immediately from writing the joint probability as the product
of conditional probabilities. Equation (24) then follows by diﬀerentiating Equation (23).
Lemma 2 f
φτ,τ
t (φ) and ˜ f
φτ,τ































subject to the boundary condition
f
φτ,τ























t (φ)=P[(φt <φ ) ∩ (φt−1 < ¯ φ) ∩ (all prior φs < ¯ φ)] =
  ¯ φ
−∞
P[φt <φ| φt−1 = x] ˜ f
φτ,τ
t−1 (x)dx =










20Diﬀerentiating this with respect to φ yields Equation (26), and this in conjunction with
Equations (24) yields Equation (25). Finally, Equations (8) and (9) tell us immediately that
f
φτ,τ











BP r o o f s
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2




t+1(φt) ≡ (¯ φ − φt)
γ +( t − τ +1 ) ω
ω




Thus, whenever rt+1 ≥ r∗
t+1(φt), the fund will trade for NAVt+1 in period t +1 .
Competitive investors must all earn the fair rate of return, r, in equilibrium, so the price
of the fund today is the expected value of the price tomorrow, discounted at r.T h i sc a nb e


























































































































































rt+1−ˆ rt+1|(rt+1 − ˆ rt+1) > (¯ φ − φt)























where the fourth line follows from the independence of ξt and  t, and the last line follows
from a well-known property of the lognormal distribution [see (Ingersoll, 1987, p.14)] and
the last line uses (27). Substituting (29), (30) and (31) into (28) yields





















































































































































the last line following from Equation (27). Independence of r follows by inspection.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let G
φτ,τ
t be the probability that a manager who starts with a fund at time τ leaves the fund


















































Now let Ht denote the probability that a fund that starts at time zero with open date T will
have a manager leave (equivalently, have a manager start) at time t.T h e n
Ht = P[Manager leaves at t]
= P[Manager leaves at t|started at 0]P[started at 0]
+P[Manager leaves at t|started at 1]P[started at 1] + ...















with the boundary condition H0 = 1. Now to calculate the expected discount:
E0(Dt)=E0(Dt | Last new manager started @ 0)P[Last new manager started @ 0])
+ E0(Dt | Last new manager started @ 1)P[Last new manager started @ 1]) + ...
+ E0(Dt | Last new manager started @ t − 1)P[Last new manager started @ t − 1]).
Taking one of these terms, we have
E0(Dt | Last new manager started @ τ)=













where the integral is the contribution to the expectation if the manager does not leave in
period t (i.e., if φt < ¯ φ), and the second term accounts for the possibility that the manager
will leave in period t, in which case the discount will automatically reset to 1. Also,
P[Last new manager started @ τ]=P[(No manager left between τ +1a n dt − 1) ∩






s (¯ φ). (36)




















































where the last line follows directly from above. The result in the proposition then follows
immediately from Lemma 1.
C Corollaries
Corollary 1 Conditional on information available at time t, φt+s is normally distributed,
with mean φt and variance
ωs
[γ + ω(t − τ)][γ + ω(t + s − τ)]
.
Proof: Iterating Equation (5), φt+s is the sum of normal random variables, so is itself


















[γ + ω(t + i − τ)]
−
1





[γ + ω(t − τ)]
−
1




[γ + ω(t − τ)][γ + ω(t + s − τ)]
.
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